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Abstract
There are several opinion dynamics models where extremism is de-
fined as part of their characteristics. However, the way extremism is
implemented in each model does not correspond to equivalent definitions.
While some models focus on one aspect of the problem, others focus on
different characteristics. This paper shows how each model only captures
part of the problem and how Bayesian inspired opinion models can help
put those differences in perspective. That discussion suggests new ways
to introduce variables that can represent the problem of extremism better
than we do today.
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1 Introduction
Understanding the problems that might arise from strong opinions, such as
polarization in political debates [1, 2, 3] or the actions of extremists [4, 5] involves
both exploring how those questions happen and evolve in the real world as well as
obtaining solid and useful theoretical models and definitions. As such, a better
comprehension of how opinion dynamics models [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
works and how it can represent those questions is a fundamental step. While
we have several models for opinion spread, we need to know how they relate
to each other better. Moreover, we also need to define the meaning of key
concepts very clearly. Some concepts are easier to define. Consensus simply
means agents end up agreeing. Polarization certainly means disagreement [15],
but it is not as simple as consensus. It also can happen in many different ways
[16]. In this paper, we will focus on exploring how opinion dynamics models have
defined extremist opinions. The consequences and conflicts of those meanings
will be discussed. We will also investigate the need to adopt a definition that is
compatible with the meaning of the term outside theoretical models.
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Opinion Dynamics models have, since their beginnings, tried to capture how
human groups reach consensus or tend to a more polarized state, where disagree-
ment prevails and, often, even gets reinforced. Discrete models [8, 9, 10, 11] tend
to do a decent job at describing situations where there are two or more clear
choices. On the other hand, when we want to know how extreme an opinion
is [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25], some kind of continuous variable tends to
work better [12, 26]. For situations where we have choices, but we still want to
model extreme views, it is common to introduce inflexibles, agents that do not
change their opinions [27]. It is also possible to use a model with both discrete
and continuous variables that are dependent on one another so that strength
and choice can be described [13, 14].
2 Different Definitions
The existence of several competing models poses the question of whether cru-
cial definitions of the relevant variables are compatible. While consensus and
polarization are defined in ways that we can easily translate from one model to
another, the same is not valid for extremism. Indeed, depending on the math-
ematical details of the models, it is easier to focus on one aspect of extremism
and ignore others. That is what happened.
Typical discrete models are perfect for talking about actions. Polarization
is naturally defined [28], and the decision to do something or not do it is also
binary. As such, they might seem a natural way to model problems such as
terrorism. In terrorism, much more important than anything else is the question
of whether a terrorist action will happen or not. It seems clear that the strength
of opinion plays a fundamental role here. To commit such terrible acts, we
expect our agents to be thoroughly convinced about their decisions. However,
discrete models are not able to make a statement about the strength of agents’
opinions. Instead, in order to capture the essence of extremist opinions, the
concept of inflexibles was introduced [19]. Here, inflexibility means only that
inflexible agents will not change their opinions, regardless of any social influence.
The idea does provide a first step towards defining extremism, even if it lacks
one crucial aspect.
Continuous models, on the other hand, can naturally speak about opinion
strength. If opinions happen on a range of possible values, it is easy to identify
the ends of that range as extreme. Of course, unless the range has some practical
meaning, such identification might be arbitrary. Nevertheless, given a specific
debate and problem, one can often order opinions on that problem over a range
in a way that extremes should be near the ends. However, such a definition fails
to capture another component of the question. The kind of extremist behavior
we are interested in is often associated with an inability to learn. An agent
who has an opinion at the end of the range but who can easily be dissuaded to
adopt a central opinion is not a typical extremist. Indeed, continuous models
often recognize the fact that extremism does not mean only an opinion at the
edge of the spectrum. By changing the range of values over which agents can
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influence each other or not [29], extremists can often be associated with smaller
uncertainties and, therefore, a smaller capacity to change their minds [30, 31,
32, 33, 34, 35]. Mechanisms of stubbornness have also been proposed to address
the problem [36, 37] and allow more realistic extremists. However, all those
considerations are usually added in an ad hoc way.
A central component of the kind of extremism we worry most about, however,
is action. Whether we are talking about anti-vaxxers campaigns that threaten
to bring back diseases we considered defeated or terrorist attacks, the opinions
themselves do not cause any harm. Harm happens when people decide they
should act based on their opinions. Opinion models that deal with extremists
must be prepared to include questions about conflict, violence, and wars [38, 39].
We need that ability whether the actions we want to describe can be described
as terrorism or as something else. Indeed, official sites include several conditions
to qualify an action as terrorism [40]. The need to include actions as central
suggests we might need models where we have decision thresholds for extremist
actions [41] (not to be confused with thresholds for the number of influencers
in an update rule [42]). As an example, that can be implemented if joining a
movement is decided by a utility rule [43]. Indeed, the action of joining seems
central. Important parts of the problem in terrorism can be explained with the
use of a club model, where sacrifices and commitments are required from joiners
to ensure non-defection [44]. Of course, identifying and modelling networks
[45, 46, 47] including hidden ones [48] and the echo chambers [49, 50, 51, 52]
where extremist discourse happens is fundamental. Nevertheless, proper opinion
models can also help us understand strong opinions better. That can help us
understand support for all types of ideas and movements, dangerous or not [53].
We need definitions that include decisions and strength of opinion in the
same model. The possibility of using decision thresholds for joining or support-
ing extremist groups suggest probability models can be useful in this approach
[54]. Indeed, by using probabilities as a measure of opinion and choices based
on those probabilities, the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Actions (CODA)
model was able to show how extremism can appear even no extremists exist in
the initial conditions[13, 22]. CODA also shows regular interactions can lead
to the appearance of inflexibles [55]. More recently, applications of the CODA
model to decision problems about actions in health-related problems have been
proposed [56, 57]. More than that, the model was also used to propose a formal-
ism that can incorporate any kind of information exchange and agent mental
models [14]. As such, it can provide an excellent tool for us to investigate the
different meanings extremism has.
3 Theoretical ways to define extremism
3.1 Wishers and Mixers
Exploring variations of the CODA model can help us understand it better some
of the problems with defining extremism. Take, for example, its extension with
3
the introduction of the concepts of wishers and mixers as mental models, coupled
with differences in communication [58]. The original CODA model corresponds
to wishers, agents who wish to find out which of two options is the best one.
The agents assume options are excludent so, if one is best, the other should be
avoided. However, if agents were mixers, interested in finding an ideal mix of
the two options, we need a different model for how they interpret the opinions
of other agents.
Instead of just pointing to the best choice between options A and B, mixers
assume there is an ideal proportion pA that should be assigned to A. As a
consequence,the proportion pB = 1− pA should be assigned to B. What agents
communicate in this model is not so clear. They can, in principle, share their
average estimate for pA. In this case, with continuous communication and the
update of the related continuous variable, we get a Bayesian inspired version of
the Bounded Confidence models [32]. However, if we assume agents tell each
other which choice they think is the most common one, we still have a discrete
choice in the model. In that case, things get more interesting. As the simplest
possible mental model, agents might assume that, when observing other agents,
they are sampling from a Binomial distribution with probability pA. From their
initial opinions on pA, they can use what they observe to update their opinions
on pA.
The simplest way to implement that is to notice that the conjugate distri-
bution to a Binomial likelihood is a Beta Be(α, β) distribution with parameters
α and β associated to A and B, respectively. That means that, if we assume
an initial opinion is well described by a Beta distribution, after observing their
neighbors, agents will update their opinions and still get a Beta, with just its
parameters changed. The update rule becomes quite simple. When agent i
observes j thinks A should happen more often, it adds one to its α. If j choice
is B, one is added to B. The most frequent choice is determined by the sign of
the difference ν = α − β. Therefore, the dynamics of the most frequent choice
is obtained by just adding or subtracting 1 to ν, depending on whether A or B
is observed as the most common part of the mixture.
The first thing one should notice here is that, aside from an irrelevant nor-
malization parameter, that is exactly the dynamics one finds in the traditional
CODA model [13]. The main difference is the meaning of ν, in the original
CODA. There, it was defined as ν = ln( pA1−pA ). However, since the dynamics
on both νs are identical, as well as the choice rule, if one starts with the same
initial conditions and use the same random generator draws, the evolution of the
choices in the CODA model with wishers will turn out identical to the evolution
of preferred choice in the model with mixers. Indeed, after the clusters stabilize,
there are also important similarities between both models and the traditional
majority model [59, 60, 19].
However, if one looks at the probabilities one obtains as a result of the two
versions, results could not be more different. Translating the model parameters
(α and β, or ν) back to probabilities, one can find that a preferred mix with
93% of A for mixers can correspond to a probability that A is better around 1−
10−300 for wishers. In both cases, it would take the same amount of interactions
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for the agents to change their favored state. In the sense of how easy it is
for agents in both cases to change their preferences, their opinions are equally
extreme. Nevertheless, the comparison of the actual probability values tells a
much different story. One mental model leads to practical certainty in favor of
an option. The other leads to coexistence, even if the mixing is clearly biased
towards one of the choices.
3.2 Continuous CODA inspired model
A similar situation can be observed if we use Bayesian ideas to obtain a model
that is similar to the Bounded Confidence class of models [32, 61]. Here, we
can assume agents have an initial opinion represented by a Normal distribution,
N(xi, σ
2
i ). In order to represent the fact agents in Bounded Confidence model
do not trust others whose opinion is too distant, the likelihood includes both a
Normal term around the best value θ, that has a probability p associated to it,
as well as a Uniform part, that enters with probability 1 − p, representing the
possibility j knows nothing about the problem. If we assume agents think other
agents are as uncertain as they are, we have
f(xj |θ) = pN(θ, σ2i ) + (1− p)U(0, 1). (1)
From that we can obtain an update rule for the average estimate xi (assuming
only the average and not the whole distribution get updated) given by
xi(t+ 1) = p
∗xi(t) + xj(t)
2
+ (1− p∗)xi(t) (2)
where
p∗ =
p 1√
2piσi
e
− (xi(t)−xj(t))
2
2σ2
i
p 1√
2piσi
e
− (xi(t)−xj(t))
2
2σ2
i + (1− p)
. (3)
If the distance between the opinions (xi(t)− xj(t) becomes too large, p∗ tends
to zero and xi basically does not change, representing the lack of trust in distant
opinions. If (xi(t)−xj(t) tends to zero, on the other hand p∗ is basically p. For
initial trusts close to one, that means the agents will move towards the average
value. Those equations lead to a dynamics with the appearance of a number of
clustered opinions that depend on σi. Here, σi plays the role of the threshold
factor, representing how easy one agent trust another one with a distant opinion.
What is interesting to observe is that we can also use the Bayesian rule to
update σi. We obtain
σ2i (t+ 1) = σ
2
i (t)
(
1− p
∗
2
)
+ p∗(1− p∗)
(
xi(t)− xj(t)
2
)2
. (4)
That causes a tendency for σi to decrease with time. That tendency happens
up to the point where all agents become incapable of influencing each other. In
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other words, agents become the equivalent to agents with very low thresholds.
They are unable to update their opinions further. Unlike the ad-hoc models
where this kind of stubbornness is limited to the edges of the opinions, where
we expect to define extremists, this inability to learn happens for agents with
all values of average opinions. They all become inflexibles.
4 M possible choices
In order to discuss the difference between inflexibles and opinions at the ex-
tremes, it is also useful to discuss a case where we can model anything from
independent choices to choices aligned over an ideological axis. That is possible
if we study discrete models with more than two choices. In order to obtain
the simplest possible model, the proper choice for variables is the set of νq(q+1)
defined as the log-odds of the probabilities between two consecutive choices:
νq(q+1) = ln
p(q)
p(q + 1)
, (5)
There are M − 1 independent parameters νq(q+1) and the probabilities p(q) for
each choice q, where q = 1, · · · ,M can be computed back from the νq(q+1) by
using the set of Equations 5.
The dynamics that emerge from this model have the same pattern of the
traditional CODA model. Local reinforcement causes the appearance of regions
where each one of the options is the only supported choice. With the appearance
of those regions, opinions inside them tend to become more and more extreme.
4.1 Likelihoods and the dynamics of the model
Equation 5 can be obtained from simple considerations on how agents update
their opinions on each possible choice q when they observe a neighbor j who
prefers choice m. While still working with the probabilities of each possible q,
we can define a likelihood matrix Lmn = p(aj = m|x∗ = n). That is, Lmn
represent the mental model each agent has for how other agents’ choices are
related to the best option or, in other terms, how like j is to prefer m (aj = m),
assuming the best choice is n (xn = n).
Using Equation 5 to define the consecutive log-odds as basic parameters and
applying the Bayes theorem directly to the probabilities p(q), we get an update
rule for the opinions of agent i [62]. When i observes that agent j prefers choice
m, we have, for every q = 1, . . . ,M
νq(q+1)(t+ 1) = ln
p(q, t+ 1)
p((q + 1), (t+ 1))
= ln
p(q, t)Lmq
p((q + 1), t)Lm(q+1)
,
and, therefore,
νq(q+1)(t+ 1) = νq(q+1)(t) + ln
[
Lmq
Lm(q+1)
]
. (6)
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It is interesting to see that, while the full log-odds likelihood matrix of the
interactions, defined as
Lmqr = ln
[
Lmq
Lmr
]
,
is what tells us directly how the relation between the probabilities p(q) and p(r)
change when the observed agent j prefers m, we only need to keep track of the
cases where r = q + 1. That happens because if you know the ratio between
p(1) and p(2) and well as the ratio between p(2) and p(3), the ratio between
p(1) and p(3) can be trivially obtained and so on. The set of variables νq(q+1)
is enough to calculate all probabilities.
In the case where the M choices were symmetrical, the symmetry meant
that there was only one independent parameter in Lmqr and, as a consequence,
in Lmq, no matter how large M was.
However, to see more clearly what the model can say about the definitions
of extremism, the symmetrical case is not the most appropriate one. As we will
see, if the choices correspond to positions over a one-dimensional ideological line,
some questions about what we mean by extreme opinions will appear naturally.
Luckily, the original model with M choices can represent independent choices
as well as choices over a one-dimensional ideological line. Intermediate cases or
situations that correspond to choices in a higher dimensional ideological space
can also be easily introduced. The model for each of those cases is essentially
the same. The only difference happens in the values of the likelihoods one uses
to define the mental models of the agents.
That is, we need to figure which set of likelihoods Lmq would describe a one-
dimensional situation. For example, assume we have M = 5 possible choices.
For the sake of this example, we can identify those positions as extreme-left,
left, center, right, and extreme-right, corresponding to the cases m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
respectively. Those descriptions might match similar political descriptions, or
they might just refer to the positions in a specific drawing about the subject.
That suggests that, if one specific value of m is the best choice, it would be
natural to expect other agents to pick that choice with higher probability. It is
also reasonable to expect that values closer to m, such as m−1 or m+ 1 should
be observed with a larger likelihood than those at a distance of 2 or more (of
course, that is restricted to possible values). Those inequalities assume agents
believe others to be more likely to be correct, of course. Situations where one
expects others to be extremists and not necessarily correct would lead to a
diverse choice of likelihood values and distinct dynamics.
One way to do it is simply to choose by hand values for Lmq that respect those
inequalities. However, that means we would have too many free parameters.
Arguments of symmetry can diminish the 20 independent likelihoods in M = 5
(25 conditions m|q minus 5 requirements probabilities must add to 1) to 9 or 10
depending on some assumptions, but that is still too much. In particular, for
even larger M , the number of possible likelihoods become too large.
A much simpler way to model likelihoods that correspond to the expected
inequalities is to define a continuous space where the choices correspond to
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Figure 1: Representation of the one-dimensional choices as consecutive regions
over a continuous variable. Possible likelihoods are shown centered on the ex-
treme left choice (red) as well as the central one (blue).
specific ranges and to use continuous probability distributions centered at each
choice. Figure 1 shows a representation of that idea, with five regions. In that
figure, the first region, which we can call extreme-left, correspond to values over
the range [0, 1]; the left, in the range [1, 2], and so, up to the extreme right, in
the range [4, 5]. Possible continuous distributions for this case are shown for the
assumptions that extreme-left might be best (red) and that the center might be
the best choice (blue).
Likelihoods might be consistently defined simply as proportional to the
height of the continuous function at the center of each range or proportional
to the area under the distribution (total probability) in the same region. The
choice is arbitrary. Both correspond to the case where the inequalities suggested
above are respected, as long as a Normal-like distributions are used. That is, any
distribution that has only one central maximum, is monotonically decrescent at
both sides as we move away from that maximum, and is symmetrical.
Picking the height of the distribution might be a little easier but there is one
question that comes naturally only when we consider the actual probabilities
(areas). There are parts of the distributions that fall outside the range of all
M boxes. One can, of course, use only the boxes and renormalize. But, in
circumstances where there is an expectation that extreme opinions might be
more common than they should be, including the tail probabilities in the ex-
treme cases might be used to represent that. That possibility can generate cases
where our desired inequalities are not satisfied, however. Both cases, renormal-
ized and with tail probabilities included in the extreme values, were included
in the initial exploratory simulations. There were no qualitative differences,
however. Tail probabilities just exacerbated the observed behavior for large
likelihood uncertainty. That behavior will be described below.
The first thing one learns when trying to use unbounded extreme boxes is the
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importance of the difference in likelihoods. Assume each box has a size of one
and that the chance each choice is observed is given by a Normal or a t-Student
distibution centered on the box with a standard deviation given by σl. As initial
exploratory simulations showed that the degrees of freedom of a t-distribution
had a similar effect to the standard deviation, all cases in this article correspond
to a t-distribution with 30 degrees of freedom, which is reasonably close to a
Normal distribution.
It is easy to observe in all implementations that, for large values of σl, the
central opinions tend to almost disappear in the long run. Central opinions sur-
vive only in transition regions between the more extreme options. That behavior
can be seen in Figure 2, where the final preferences for specific realizations of
the M choices model after T = 50 average interactions per agent are shown.
The first line corresponds to M = 3 cases, and the second one to M = 5. When
M = 3, preferences correspond to the ordered colors red, green, and blue. When
M = 5, the colors representing each choice were red, yelow, green, cyan, and
blue, ordered from extreme left to extreme right. Strength of opinion for choice
m was measured as the log-odds of m against all other possibilities, that is
νm = ln
p(m)
1− p(m) .
Darker hues correspond to stronger opinions, that is, larger values of νm. Corre-
spondence between hues and values of νm are specific to each landscape, chosen
for ease of visualization. Different likelihoods correspond to distinct columns.
The left column shows the cases where σl = 0.5; central columns, σl = 1.0;
and right columns, σl = 2.0. While the figures correspond to only one realiza-
tion, the same behavior was observed in each case over 20 repetitions of each
parametrization.
The most apparent feature of those landscapes is the fact that, while for
σl = 0.5, the most common surviving choice is the central green color choice
(m = 2 when M = 3 and m = 3 when M = 5), that tendency gets reversed as
σl increases. For M = 3, a value of σl = 1.0 is enough to make the green choice
just a boundary between the red and blue choices and as σl = 2.0, even a good
part of the green boundary disappears. Almost no centrists seem to be left.
For M = 5, we see an intermediate state when σl = 1.0, where all colors seem
to coexist. When σl = 2.0, however, we observe once more that we only have
regions of the extreme choices, red and blue. The three intermediate options
survive only in the boundaries between red and blue, the same as in the M = 3
case.
To understand why that happens, one must look at the likelihood values in
Table 1 and the log-likelihoods one obtain from those. We can see that, when
we have σl = 1.0 and an agent who supports m = 1 is observed, that causes
a change in the variables so that ν12 (evidence supporting 2 over 1) decreases
by approximatedly 0.69 and ν23 decreases by 1.1. Of course, ν13 changes by
decreasing 1.79, but that is a consequence of the two other values. On the other
hand, when agent j supports m = 2, we have ν12 = +0.24 and, symmetrically
ν23 = −0.24. When agent j supports m = 3, we have the symmetrical, opposite
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Figure 2: Opinion landscapes showing final preferences for specific realizations
of the M choices model after T = 50 average interactions per agent. Each color
corresponds to a specific choice, while opinion strength is shown by a lighter
(weaker opinion) to darker (stronger) hue of the collor. Left column figures
correspond to σl = 0.5, central columns, to σl = 1.0 and right columns to
σl = 2.0. Top line: Case where M = 3 is shown, colored in tones of red, green,
and blue. Bottom line: Case where M = 5 is shown, colored in tones of red,
yelow, green, cyan, and blue.
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values for when m = 1. Similarly, when σl = 0.5, we have that, when an agent
who supports m = 1 is observed, ν12 = −1.6 and ν23 = −3.9. If agent j supports
m = 2, however, ν12 = +1.3 and, symmetrically ν23 = −1.3.
Table 1: Likelihoods for different values of σl
σl = 0.5
Likelihoods 1 2 3
1 80.6% 16.1% 0.3%
2 19.1% 67.8% 19.1%
3 0.3% 16.1% 80.6%
σl = 1.0
Likelihoods 1 2 3
1 55.7% 27.8% 9.3%
2 35% 44.3% 35%
3 9.3% 27.8% 55.7%
That is, when we pick a small σl, it is expected that, when choice m is
correct, it will be observed more often than it would be the case for a larger
σl. That has a particularly significant effect on central choices. As σl gets
larger, extreme opinions are still distant from one another and that means it
is easier to distinguish them by observing the choices of the neighbors. The
same is not valid for central choices. Notice that when σl = 1.0, observing an
extreme choice drives the log-odd between the extreme and central opinions of
agent i by 0.69. If the central choice is observed, however, the log-odds in favor
of the central opinion, however, increases only by 0.24. That means observing
an extremist has a much stronger influence than a centrist (a factor of almost
three). For σl = 0.5, there is still a difference, but much weaker (1.6 versus
1.3). In that case, the initial random configuration, where most agents start in
a mixed neighborhood, seems to lead the system to a state where the central
opinion is preferred. The same analysis can be performed when M = 5.
While mapping the cases where each opinion becomes predominant is a fas-
cinating subject in itself, for this paper, the case where σl = 0.5 is the most
illustrative one. We can see in the first column of Figure 2 that not only the
central green choice dominates, it also creates regions where the agents reinforce
their opinions in favor of the central choice. While lighter shades of green are
observed in the boundaries, agents who only observe centrists do gain a firm
opinion in favor of their choices. Given enough interactions, they can easily be
labeled as extremists in favor of the central choice. Indeed, it might be difficult
to change their choices. Those agents do become inflexibles in a practical sense,
just as inflexibility can emerge when in the simpler M = 2 case [55]. If those
opinions in favor of the central choice are extreme or not depends on how one
defines the term.
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5 Discussion
Opinion dynamics needs a better definition of extremism. Our models do not
agree with each other on what it means. However, the reason for the disagree-
ment is not that the definitions in some of those models are wrong. Instead,
they capture different aspects of the same problem. Extremists rarely change
their positions. Models can model that either as actual inflexibles [27] or as
opinions so strong they behave as if they were inflexibles [55]. On the other
hand, when we talk about the ideological axis, extremism is indeed usually
strongly associated with opinions near the edges. That is not a necessity, how-
ever, and it is possible to have extremist behaviors defending all kinds of values
or choices over that axis, even central ones. That is true, at least in principle.
Indeed, in the model with M choices, those choices can be independent. In that
case, there would be no actual central choice, and we would quickly agree that
extremism can happen in favor of all preferences. From a modeling point of
view, the only difference between independent choices and choices aligned on
one ideological axis (or, possibly, on a multiple dimensional ideological space)
rests on the choices of likelihoods. An agent can become extremist in favor of
the central choice.
There is one more aspect we must introduce in our models. Having strong
and stubborn opinions is not enough to make someone an extremist. Being
certain is not the same as being extreme. There are problems where stubborn
opinions are not a problem at all. They just mean agents might be very sure
about something. When certainty is warranted, strong opinions might even
be correct. However, they do become problematic when associated with either
very distorted views of the world or with the decision to commit violent actions.
Violence or not, problematic extreme views are always linked to acting on those
views. So, we need frameworks that allow us to speak of the strength of opinions,
choices, and actions. Actions are a particular type of choice that can be easily
implemented in a Bayesian inspired model. That is why the problems with
definitions became much clearer when we looked at extensions of the CODA
model. As the meaning of terms become better defined and implemented, we
should be able to propose better models for human exchanges of information.
One first fundamental step towards more realistic models is to define extremism
in a way that captures its many distinct characteristics.
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